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STUDENT COMMENT
United States Export of Banned Products:
Legal and Moral Implications
PATRICK B. SEFEROVICH
I. THE PROBLEM
The extent of human suffering and environmental harm resulting
from trade in banned or restricted pesticides cannot be fully
documented.'
In 1975, the Texas-based Velsicol Chemical Corporation exported the
nerve-attacking pesticide Leptophos (Phosvel) to thirty countries. Over
half of its total export was shipped to Egypt, a country with no proce-
dures for pesticide regulation or tolerance setting. The use of Leptophos
in Egypt resulted in the deaths of several Egyptian farmers and severe
convulsions and speech impairments in others. American workers also be-
came partially paralyzed from similar amounts of exposure, and traces of
the pesticide were found on tomatoes in the United States which were
imported from Mexico.' Despite the harm that was done, the Velsicol
Corporation continued to export the product while proclaiming its
Patrick B. Seferovich, a J.D. candidate at T.C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond, Virginia, is currently completing his final year of law school as a special student
at the University of Denver College of Law. M.A., 1973, University of Virginia; B.A., 1969,
Arizona State University.
1. U.S. Export of Banned Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978) (statement of S. Jacob Scherr, Attorney for the Natural Resources
Defense Council) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Neither the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) nor the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is able to collect data
regarding export volume. Trade statistics on the export of particular products are either
nonexistent or incomplete and difficult to obtain. Monitoring problems stem in part from
the present inadequacy in export laws: products manufactured for export only are generally
exempt from reporting requirements of U.S. laws. Furthermore, many of the records which
are maintained are often considered as trade secrets and thus are never disclosed to the
public nor to the appropriate regulatory body. While the Department of Commerce does
compile records of all exports, the department's method of compilation makes it virtually
impossible to ascertain which products were banned or restricted in the United States.
The export of banned products is not limited to restricted or banned pesticides. Cur-
rently, exports include several categories of hazardous products banned in the United
States: food dyes, cyclamate food sweetners, certain foods, cosmetics, drugs, and other con-
sumer products. Id. at 3.
2. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at A], col. 1.
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safety.3 Leptophos was never registered with the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA).
In Guatemala, a country with widespread poverty, mothers' milk has
been contaminated with DDT.4 Most of it has come from the United
States." The export of grain coated with mercury fungicides, a chemical
banned in the United States, resulted in the deaths of at least 400 Iraqis
and the hospitalization of 5,000 more.' Herbicide 2.4.5-T, a pesticide sim-
ilar in makeup to Agent Orange 7 was exported to South America even
after the EPA canceled its registration for most domestic uses. In Colum-
bia, tests have shown a link between the consumption of food products
coated with this herbicide and a number of miscarriages and deformed
babies. Approximately 500,000 persons worldwide are poisoned each year
and as many as 5,000 die from herbicide 2.4.5-T.8 The World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) adds that this figure does not include thousands of
people who are affected by the chemical in some other way, such as those
who develop cancers ten to fifteen years later.'
The problem is not confined to the exportation of banned drugs or
pesticides. In June 30, 1977, a ban on U.S.-manufactured baby pacifiers
which caused choking deaths in infants was proposed by the Consumer
Products Safety Commission.0 Following this proposal, notice of which
was given to appropriate U.S. manufacturers, over 500,000 of these pacifi-
ers were exported. 1 Even after the proposal became effective on February
26, 1978, at least one manufacturer continued to export the banned
pacifier.12
Should U.S. manufacturers be allowed to export, without restriction,
products which are either banned or strictly controlled domestically? Al-
though this question has received considerable debate in government and
business circles in recent years, an answer remains elusive. Despite a
growing export trade with Third World countries, often involving exports
of domestically banned substances, the United States has yet to adopt an
export policy which comprehensively addresses this question."3 The focus
3. Hearings, supra note 1, at 35.
4. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 1-2.
5. Id.
6. Farvar, The Interaction of Ecological Social Systems, in OUTER LIMITS AND HuMAN
NEEDS 70 (W. Matthews ed. 1976).
7. Hearings, supra note 1, at 49.
8. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
9. Id.
10. Hearings, supra note 1, at 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. And yet a number of factors indicate that this problem will continue to grow over
the next few years: Significant increases in world population will generate increased world-
wide needs for food, drugs, pesticides, and other products; demand for these products has
already begun to accelerate due to an increase in the number of consumer-oriented societies;
economic pressures for U.S. firms to increase exports in order to increase U.S. production
and offset a growing trade imbalance will also exacerbate the problem.
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of this paper will be to identify and discuss the more narrow issues this
question poses, with a view to proposing the establishment of a uniform
export policy.
II. BRIEF HISTORY
Historically, Third World countries provided only limited markets
for U.S. products, but as domestic regulation increased, sales in these de-
veloping countries increased accordingly. The banning of products manu-
factured in the United States for domestic consumption frequently cre-
ates large inventories, making Third World markets prime targets for the
sale and distribution of these "banned" substances. While products
designed for use by U.S. citizens often are subject to a barrage of legisla-
tive and administrative restrictions, the policy of the United States to-
ward the export of products prohibited from domestic sale can be de-
scribed as caveat emptor." Often this "buyer beware" attitude has
involved a benign refusal to disclose information as to what an export
shipment actually contains. Sometimes the problem lies with improper
labeling, incomplete instructions, or inaccurate ingredient lists. Often the
accompanying advertising is false or misleading.
. Awareness of this problem came rather suddenly after an incident
involving the export of Tris-treated sleepwear in October, 1977.15 Banned
in the United States, large surplus inventories of sleepwear treated with
this substance were quickly exported to developing countries in Africa,
Asia, and South America.' This incident brought to light one fact: The
United States has no export policy to prevent the indiscriminate dumping
of questionable products. The irony of the situation is obvious: Why
would legislators pass laws preventing the use of dangerous products at
home, but allow a loose export policy of the same commodities? The most
common explanation is that conditions in some importing countries -
rampant unemployment, overpopulation, and epidemics of insect-caused
diseases-often make U.S. standards of health and safety inappropriate.
These conditions necessitate standards that weigh risks against results,
thus allowing the use of proven products despite possible side effects.
Unfortunately this weighing of risks versus benefits has not been
done and today there are a growing number of developing countries which
are beginning to question this unfettered worldwide marketing. Some
14. Schulberg, United States Exports of Products Banned for Domestic Use, 20 HAny.
INT'L L.J. 331 (1978).
15. HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS REPORT ON EXPORT OF PRODUCTS
BANNED BY U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES, H.R. REP. No. 1686, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 SuBCOMMrIrEE REPORT]. See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 3.
16. Wash. Post, May 6, 1978, at D10, col. 1. See also Schulberg, supra note 14, at 334.
Although the CPSC eventually prohibited Tris exports, several million dollars worth of
materials treated with Tris had already been exported. Furthermore, the decision to pro-
hibit overseas sales of Tris-treated materials applied only to products manufactured for U.S.
consumption and not to products originally intended for export. Id. See also 43 Fed. Reg.
25,711 (1978).
1981
DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y
complain about being the "dumping grounds" of U.S. companies.17 In a
congressional report by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations,",
it was stated that "approximately 68 percent of foreign countries sur-
veyed indicated interest in receiving notification of U.S. regulatory
action." 19
The dichotomy between those countries that may need domestically
restricted products and those who are working to prevent this dumping
only serves to illustrate the pressing need we have in this country for a
comprehensive export policy. The repercussions of exporting banned
products are not confined to the effects felt by foreign consumers. Prod-
ucts banned for sale in the United States are manufactured here, trans-
ported here, and are often used abroad in the production of products
which eventually are reimported into the United States. Thus, many con-
cerned citizens and legislators here at home are beginning to ask for a
stricter export policy.
Clearly the U.S. government is faced with the task of formulating an
export policy which will not only reflect the capability of the importing
countries to assess the risks and benefits of the product, but will also be
attentive to the needs of those developing countries where the benefits of
some products may outweigh the risks involved. This policy must also
reflect domestic considerations: What dangers are posed by manufactur-
ing and transporting such products within the United States and what
dangers are there with the reimportation of products containing a banned
substance?
No single control policy restricting the export of all domestically
banned products will legitimately cover the entire range of exports that
include such items as pesticides, drugs, toxic chemicals, and effective but
risky medicines. In each case the nature and the certainty of the risk will
be different and, given the opportunity, the conditions within the import-
ing country will have to be weighed against the risk.
III. CONSTRUCTING AN EXPORT POLICY: ISSUES To CONSIDER
The task of developing a uniform export policy involves a number of
separate but interrelated questions.
A. Does the United States Government Have a Moral or Legal Re-
sponsibility to Prevent the Export of a Substance or Product it
17. 1978 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 11-12.
18. See 1978 SUBCOMMITEE REPORT, note 15 supra.
19. Id. at 4. The need for better standards has been expressed worldwide. In May 1978
the United Nations Environmental Program Governing Council conducted extensive discus-
sions on the sale of banned or restricted chemical products. Both developed and developing
countries were represented. The Governing Council's recommendation to exporting and im-
porting countries was that each should institute adequate monitoring, evaluative, and pro-
tective measures in regard to international commerce and chemical products. See Hearings,
supra note 1, at 34-37.
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Knows or has Reason to Believe is Dangerous?
B. Is There an International Legal Basis for Imposing a Re-
strictive Export Policy?
C. Assuming a New Export Policy is Needed, What is the Pre-
sent Capability of the United States Regulatory System to Monitor
and Enforce Such a Policy?
D. How Would a Restrictive Export Policy Affect Developing
Countries?
E. What Reforms in the Export System Should be Instituted?
A. Does the United States Government Have a Moral or Legal Respon-
sibility to Prevent the Export of a Substance or Product it Knows or Has
Reason to Believe is Dangerous?
Unquestionably the moral obligation of the United States to institute
a uniform export policy should stem from general principles of fairness
and human decency. Surely there is little or no justification for allowing
an uninformed, poverty-stricken country to use a substance that we cre-
ated but will not use ourselves because we know it is harmful. United
States adherence to the principles of the Helsinki Accords, 0 and recent
attempts by former President Carter to incorporate a sensitivity for
human rights into our foreign policy is an indication of a long-term Amer-
ican commitment to the protection of human rights and the global
environment.
As a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD),31 the United States has subscribed to internal poli-
cies which seek to protect the earth's environment by restricting the man-
ufacture of certain chemical substances.21 As a member of the United
Nations, the United States has supported the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP),2" the purpose of which has been "to provide
early warning of significant environmental risks and opportunities, and to
ensure that governments have access to the best available environmental
data.""' The United States has also subscribed to the Food and Agricul-
ture Organizaton (FAO) and to the World Health Organization (WHO) -
20. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, done at Hel-
sinki, Aug. 1, 1975, Dept. State Pub. No. 8826 (GEN'L FOR POL. SER. 298), reprinted in 14
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Helsinki Accords].
21. The OECD was established in 1960 as an intergovernmental organization consisting
of developed nations. The governing body of the OECD is the Council, which can make
decisions that are binding on member states.
22. Alston, International Regulation of Toxic Chemicals, 7 EcOLOGY L.Q. 397, 423
(1978).
23. G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 43, U.N. Doc. A/8370 (1973). UNEP
was established subsequent to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment "to promote international environmental cooperation and to act as a catalyst, stimula-
tor, and coordinator for the work on other agencies and programs." Alston, supra note 22, at
411.
24. Alston, supra note 22, at 422.
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both specialized agencies of the United Nations - whose Environmental
Health Criteria Programme (EHCP) attempts to collect data on every as-
pect of potentially dangerous chemicals.2" It seems clear from its partici-
pation in these agreements and organizations that the United States has
in fact "promised" to concern itself with those very things which the
present export system has failed to do: protect human health and the
world environment.
The long-time role of the United States as a dominant worldwide ex-
porter adds another dimension to this obligation. If only from a political
or foreign policy standpoint, the United States does not stand to gain
international respect if it continues to pollute and harm others through
the dumping of dangerous substances abroad.
A comprehensive U.S. export policy, which would operate to prevent
the unwarranted export of dangerous products would be consistent with
U.S. principles of products liability law, which have virtually eliminated
the principle of caveat emptor. A reformed export policy would also re-
move one of the most blatant inconsistencies in U.S. national legislation:
While the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)2 advo-
cates strict guidelines for the possible environmental effects of the activi-
ties of all federal agencies, the laws that govern exports cannot prevent
(except in a few narrow instances) the indiscriminate unloading of dan-
gerous U.S. products on foreign consumers.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was designed to es-
tablish environmental values as an "important element" in all planning
done by U.S. Government agencies.2 7 NEPA has been interpreted as ap-
plying to the export of products to foreign countries - products which
were banned or strictly regulated in the United States2 s and the harmful
consequences of direct or indirect federal agency activity in foreign coun-
tries.2 9 This interpretation of NEPA could form the basis of a new, more
25. The EHCP has published a number of materials relating to the composition and
effects of several chemical substances. Some of these include lead, mercury, polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCB's), and nitrates. The EHCP has also established a number of "national"
data collecting centers, which gather information relating to the use and effects of chemicals
in that environment. Id. at 412-13.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1976).
27. See Note, Exports and Environmental Injury: Applying NEPA to the Export-Im-
port Bank, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Exports and Environmen-
tal Injury].
28. See Development, Executive Order on Extraterritorial Environmental Impacts, 13
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 455, 455-57 (1979).
29. Id. at 456-57. See also Applebaum, Controlling the Environmental Hazards of In-
ternational Development, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 321, 344 (1976). NEPA requires that U.S. govern-
ment agencies consider the possible environmental "effects" of their proposed activities. Os-
tensibly, this requirement could extend to federal agencies which conduct activities abroad
affecting the environment. The extraterritorial reach of NEPA has been a topic of some
concern recently. To date no clear answer as to the extent of its application has been estab-
lished. A number of interpretations in the form of amendments or proposals have been
made. In 1978 the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued preliminary regulations
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clearly delineated U.S. export policy.
Realizing that the standards of some countries might not be the same
as those of the United States, one method of balancing ethical responsi-
bility, practical economic considerations and respect for the decisions of
other countries is to require that the importing country be made fully
aware of the potential risks of the product.
Critics of a notification policy argue that this approach would require
full publication of the thousands of regulatory actions-bans, suspen-
sions, registrations, judicial injunctions-occurring each year. They argue
that requiring a document from the government of the importing. country
indicating that it had received and considered the information would cre-
ate masses of paperwork, and would require thousands of additional man-
hours for processing. 0 Some concede that while this might be feasible in
the United States, it would be prohibitively expensive in the host coun-
try, especially in the developing countries who do not have the personnel
to handle enormous amounts of paperwork.3 ' For example, two years ago
the Ministry for Environment in Nigeria, one of the larger and richer de-
veloping countries, consisted of the Minister, one assistant and one secre-
tary."' A high level of scientific and technical expertise would also be nec-
essary to evaluate the risk-benefit trade-offs posed by a possible import.
And even if this step could be accomplished, many governments lack the
procedures and the degree of central control necessary to set and imple-
ment standards for safe use.
These arguments are legitimate concerns, but should not act to bar
the establishment of a more restrictive export system. One solution would
be to incorporate into the export policy mechanisms by which the import-
ing country could establish or upgrade its own regulatory system for as-
sessing the risks and benefits of products intended for export.
An alternative solution, one which is used to some extent today, in-
volves the role of international organizations, including the OECD, WHO
requiring full-scale environmental impact statements (EIS) for actions affecting the United
States, the global commons, and Antarctica. The proposal also called for a detailed "Foreign
Environmental Statement" for actions affecting only the environment of one or more foreign
nations. Since the focus of these proposed amendments was international activities actually
conducted by federal agencies, it is unclear whether the export action or inactions of the
FDA, EPA, and the CPSC would come under NEPA's EIS requirements, even if the CEQ
amendments were enacted. Nonetheless, a logical connection does exist between these three
federal agencies and the "effects" of their action relative to the exportation of banned pesti-
cides, drugs, etc. in foreign countries. CEQ preliminary draft regulations are reprinted in
124 CONG. REc. S6513-14 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978).
The CEQ proposal met with disfavor in many circles. In response, President Carter and
Senator Adlai Stevenson proposed alternatives, both of which provide for sharp limitations
on the extraterritorial reach of NEPA. For a more indepth discussion of this topic, see Ex-
ports and Environmental Injury, note 27 supra.
30. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
31. Id.
32. 1978 SUaCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 27.
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and FAQ. s Many of these international agencies presently provide data
banks on substances which are potentially dangerous to health and envi-
ronment. Thus, the understaffed countries could turn to these organiza-
tions in order to make the important risk-benefit analysis. 34 To those
countries with a small regulatory agency, or none at all, the international
body might be used as their "own" regulatory agency away from home.
This would also give these countries the necessary training and expertise
to eventually establish their own systems.
The developing countries which have in the past imported many of
these banned substances are becoming increasingly aware of the potential
hazards posed by certain chemicals and consumer products. The presi-
dent of Sierra Leone recently turned down an offer of $25 million from a
Colorado firm wanting to export toxic wastes from U.S. factories.3 5 Mex-
ico recently shut down several pesticide (DBCP) factories.36 A physician
in Bangladesh stated that he was "especially outraged at the number of
useless drugs being sold at high prices, and at the fact that infant formula
is being promoted by Western companies as a substitute for more nour-
ishing breast milk.
'3 7
The result of this seems to be that developing countries, in spite of
their understaffed ministries, will increasingly search for products that
have some indicia of reliability and safety. As a matter of fact, many of
these countries have actually come forward and asked that the United
States should not allow the export of products that are dangerous to man
or the environment. In 1977, Dr. Kiano, Kenya's Minister for Water De-
velopment, called for "international action to stop countries being used as
experimental dumping grounds for drugs and chemical products.""
33. See text accompanying note 25 supra. Other international organizations which
could play a role in resolving this important problem are: Global Environmental Monitoring
System (GEMS), the International Referral Service (IRS), the International Register of Po-
tentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC), the Codex Alimentarius Commission (the CAC was es-
tablished in 1962 to implement the Joint Food and Agriculture Organization-World Health
Organization (FAO/WHO) Food Standards Programme), and the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC). This list is not exhaustive but only representative of some of
the more significant international bodies which have the capability of effecting changes with
present exportation problems.
34. This author does not advocate "passing" to international organizations U.S. respon-
sibility for enacting and implementing protective export measures. The goal should be one
of cooperation between exporter, importer, and international bodies able to offer assistance.
Others have expressed more extreme positions:
I am very concerned about the suggestion that we [the United States] should
solve this problem by giving some international organization the responsibility.
I think it is kind of an elegant way of saying we are going to pass the buck...
. I would prefer to see it being done directly by the exporting countries.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 41 (statement of S. Jacob Scherr).
35. Wash. Post, Feb 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Dr. Kiano urged that "unless a product has been fully tested and certified and
widely used in the countries of origin, it should not be used for export." Hearings, supra
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American industry, nevertheless, argues that "[wihat the United
States won't export, West Germany and other countries will. '" Since
many of these countries will remain without export controls, American
industry, under a strict export policy, would face a competitive disadvan-
tage in world markets and might be forced to relocate in areas without
such regulation or countries with more hospitable regulatory surround-
ings, such as the less-developed countries (LDC's).
This argument-that with increased export regulation U.S. industry
would be at a competitive disadvantage in world markets-assumes that
all importers make decisions based on price alone, and is therefore mis-
placed. The imposition of regulations may very well enhance the desire
by developing countries for U.S. exporters vis-A-vis other unregulated ex-
porting countries.0 The argument also ignores the "boomerang effect" of
many of these exported chemicals and pesticides. Nerve-damaging ke-
pone, for example, was manufactured in Virginia for export only and was
sprayed on Guatemalan bananas destined for U.S. markets.41 Other
chemicals, such as aldrin, dieldrin, ehptachlor, and chlordane-banned
here but made available for export-often come back to haunt this coun-
try in the form of cacao from Ecuador, coffee from Costa Rica, and sugar
and tea from India. 4
The argument that U.S. manufacturers might be forced to relocate in
foreign countries (especially in LDC's) if export regulations are increased
is also not persuasive. Many of the products banned here were never orig-
inally intended for Third World markets and it is unlikely that these in-
dustries would seek to relocate on this basis alone.
Unless those exporting companies derive a substantial percentage of
sales from exports, it is unlikely they will seek to relocate. However, even
assuming there are a sufficient number of relocated industries to cause
concern, there are a number of measures that could be taken to reverse or
reduce relocation. Positive measures might include subsidies or low inter-
est rate loans to pay the costs of meeting new standards.'8 Negative mea-
sures might include the "withdrawal of government business or fiscal in-
centives from the offending firm, the blocking of foreign exchange
transfers to finance new development, or the threat of harsher import
standards." 44 Further obstacles to relocation would be the political and
economic instability of many underdeveloped countries and the fact that
note 1, at 34 (quoted statement of S. Jacob Scherri.
The fifty-eight nation UNEP Governing Council incorporated Dr. Kiano's views into its
decision that "there have been unethical practices concerning the distribution of chemicals,
drugs, cosmetics, and food unfit for human consumption and that there is a need for harmo-
nious cooperation between exporting and importing countries." Id.
39. Wash, Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
40. Alston, supra note 22, at 401. See also Schulberg, supra note 14, at 362.
41. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
42. Id.
43. Alston, supra note 22, at 450.
44. Id.
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demanding standards may be enacted after the company has ar-
rived"4'-thus nullifying any real savings.
B. Is There An International Legal Basis for Imposing a Restrictive
Export Policy?
There are no international agreements or treaties which focus di-
rectly on the liability of an exporter of domestically banned substances.
In recent years, however, several multilateral arrangements and organiza-
tions have arisen which indicate a trend toward stricter international co-
operation in world trade and technological development.
As an outgrowth of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was
established to promote international environmental cooperation and to
act as a coordinator of other related agencies and programs.4" One of
UNEP's objectives is to establish a warning system to provide notice to
countries whose environment and human health may be affected by the
export of hazardous substances.4 7 To this end UNEP has established the
International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC),4 the
purpose of which is to reduce the health and environmental hazards
presented by chemicals by facilitating universal access to existing scien-
tific and regulatory data."9 The United States was a participant in the
1972 Stockholm Conference and is a member of UNEP.
As a member of such international organizations as FAO, WHO, and
OECD'0 the United States has supported an international policy which
seeks "to protect the health of consumers and to ensure fair practice in
the trade, [and] to promote coordination of all food standards ... ,
45. Id. at 451. Alston also suggests that development assistance might be withheld from
an industry proposing to relocate in LDC's by organizations such as the World Bank and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), unless appropriate environmental
controls are incorporated into their relocation program.
46. Id. at 411. See also United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stock-
holm, 5-16 June 1972), 1 U.N. GAOR (21st. plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 Rev. 1
(1972), reprinted in 11 Isrr'L LEGAL MAT. 1416 (1972).
47. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 369.
48. Alston, supra note 22, at 422. In practice the IRPTC will be closely linked to two
major components of the UNEP Earthwatch program: the International Referral System
(IRS) and the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS). One of IRPTC's objec-
tives is to register all chemicals that have been objectively assessed to possess either toxic or
potentially toxic properties. But the IRPTC will have to rely on such agencies as WHO,
UNEP, and IARC to effectively assess and evaluate the wide spectrum of data they obtain.
The ultimate burden of evaluating the data, which the IRPTC has prepared, will be on the
using country. Theoretically, the cost of research, duplication of research, and uninformed
decision making can be reduced under the IRPTC program. Unfortunately, communication
and understanding gaps still exist between the information gathered by the IRPTC and the
ill-equipped and untrained officials from many importing countries who desperately need
this information.
49. Id. at 423.
50. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
51. Alston, supra note 22, at 412.
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The OECD, probably the most effective international group to date, has
advocated the "polluter pays" principle 2 and, in cooperation with the
United Nations and the European Economic Community, has been able
to restrict the manufacture and use of certain chemicals in all twenty-four
of the OECD member nations."
In 1975 the United States along with thirty-four other nations signed
the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). Among the general provisions of the Act it is stated that:
The participating States...
[1] consider that their trade in various products should be con-
ducted in such a way as not to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury...
[21 will take measures further to improve conditions for the expan-
sion of contacts between representatives of official bodies, of the dif-
ferent organizations, enterprises, firms and banks concerned with for-
eign trade, in particular, where useful between sellers and users of
products and services.
[3] reaffirm their interest to achieve the widest possible international
harmonization of standards and technical regulations. ....
The act also puts forth the following objectives on international envi-
ronmental cooperation:
The participating States ... [agree]
[1] to study, with a view to their solution, those environmental
problems which, by their nature, are of a multilateral, bilateral, re-
gional or subregional dimension . . .
52. Id. at 422.
53. Id. at 423. Alston's thesis is that currently there are several institutional barriers to
effective international regulation of toxic chemicals. Some of these are: nonexistent or ineffi-
cient testing programs; reluctance of manufacturers and national governments to provide
their own data to international bodies; and the lack of referrable international testing stan-
dards which are critical in overcoming the fear and inertia of nations who would rather rely
on their own information. Aiston suggests that four existing international initiatives or pro-
grams could significantly improve the results of international regulatory efforts, which in the
past have been piecemeal in their problem-solving approach. Alston seems to believe that
this "piecemeal or categorical" approach has now been abandoned in favor of a comprehen-
sive and cohesive program involving four international organizations: (1) The International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC); (2) The International Register of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals (IRPTC); (3) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD); and (4) The European Economic Community (EEC). Id.
Unfortunately, it is doubtful even this innovative approach will quickly overcome the
fear of inertia that characterizes most nations when asked to rely on an international body
for vital information and support. With the establishment of a consortium of international
bodies one obstacle toward greater international reliance may have been overcome. But the
credibility of international bodies vis & vis national-state reliance will probably not become
functional until there is greater participation in the international consortium by respected
and highly qualified representatives from a majority of the most influential nations.
54. The Helsinki Accords, supra note 20, at 1300, 1301, 1304. [Emphasis added.]
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[2] to increase the effectiveness of national and international mea-
sures for the protection of the environment, by the comparison and, if
appropriate, the harmonization of methods of gathering and analyzing
facts, by improving the knowledge of pollution phenomena and ra-
tional utilization of natural resources, by the exchange of information
. . . in the field of the environment;
[3] to take the necessary measures to bring environmental policies
closer together and, where appropriate and possible, to harmonize
them;
[4] to encourage, where possible and appropriate, national and in-
ternational efforts by their interested organizations, enterprises and
firms in the development, production and improvement of equipment
designed for monitoring, protecting, and enhancing the environment. 5
The most logical step the United States could take to bring itself in
line with these international commitments (especially with those sections
italicized above) would be to enact a new export policy - a policy which
would generally monitor U.S. foreign trade through comprehensive notifi-
cation and certification procedures.
In spite of the implied commitment in these multilateral arrange-
ments, it is not clear whether an international tribunal would hold an
exporting country liable for causing harm to the importing nation (assum-
ing the parties to the suit were also parties to the agreement). Since many
of these arrangements are couched in general terms serving primarily to
promote world peace and "future" cooperation through diplomacy, it is
doubtful that a defendant-exporter would be held liable based on these
arrangements.
From an international law standpoint, these international statements
become increasingly significant in light of several earlier international de-
cisions where two countries were held liable by an international tribunal
for causing harm to another country. In the Trail Smelter Arbitration,"
emission of sulphur dioxide fumes from a private smelting operation in
British Columbia caused harm to timber and crops in Washington State.
An international tribunal held Canada liable under international law for
the acts of its nationals.
57
In The Corfu Channel Case,58 Albania was held liable for the damage
to two British vessels which hit sea mines in Albania's territorial waters,
55. Id. at 1307-08. [Emphasis added.]
56. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911
(1938), id. at 1905 (1941), reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939) and in 35 Am. J. INT'L
L. 684 (1941).
57. Id.
58. The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. 4, 18. See also
Schulberg, supra note 14, at 371. For a more detailed discussion of state liability for causing
environmental harm to another state, see generally Arbitblit, The Plight of American Citi-
zens Injured by Transboundary River Pollution, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1979); Schneider,
State Responsibility for Environmental Protection and Preservation: Ecological Unities
and a Fragmented World Public Order, 2 YALE. STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 32 (1975).
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despite the fact that Albania had not placed them there. In this case the
International Court of Justice stated that is is "every State's obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States."" Thus, in both cases liability was imputed to the
state because it knew that its nationals (or others) were engaged in poten-
tially harmful acts. 0
In The Lac Lanoux Arbitration between France and Spain, a distinc-
tion was made between activities that have purely domestic implications
for the exporting national and those that have regional or even global
consequences."
These three cases stand for the proposition of international law that
a nation may not use its resources or property or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to injure another state. One commentator
has suggested that the logical extension of this norm would be to include
potentially dangerous exports into the class of such activity that can
cause injuries abroad." Ostensibly, if liability were to attach to the ex-
porter of hazardous products which cause harm in the importing country,
then some form of self-imposed restraint (e.g., better export regulations)
would be forthcoming, enforcement mechanisms aside. At a minimum,
there is a basis in international law for establishing a duty to prevent one
country from harming another through "dumping" dangerous substances
on an uninformed or misinformed underdeveloped country.
While the holding in Trail Smelter has been the most frequently
cited basis in customary international law for a state's obligation to pre-
vent extraterritorial injury,3 it does not totally proscribe injury to a
neighbor's property, but requires a balancing of interests." Some argue
59. (19491 I.C.J. at 22.
60. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 370.
61. Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1963) (in
the original French), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959) (condensed English
translation).
62. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 371. Schulberg argues that a state's responsibility
should extend "to assisting importing nations to ensure that known dangerous pesticides
being produced in [the exporting country's] factory do not injure the foreign farm worker'or,
the consumers of the agricultural products grown in that neighboring country." Id.
Schulberg's rationale appears to be that if a state can be held responsible for "emis-
sions" from its factories which cause harm to another state, then a state which allows "ex-
ports" from factories which also cause harm to another state should also be held liable.
Schulberg suggests that the result of such a holding could be the establishment of a stan-
dard imposing a responsibility on producer nations to provide recipient nations with warn-
ings that it is foreseeable that the products they are about to export could cause serious
human and environmental harm. Id.
Under this analysis, products banned or restricted for domestic use in the United States
would automatically require warnings to importing countries, since the foreseeability of
harm would clearly be established by the U.S. determination that such products should be
banned or restricted.
63. Arbitblit, supra note 58, at 362.
64. Id. at 363.
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that a state violates the principle of Trail Smelter when "it avails itself of
its right in an arbitrary manner in such a way as to inflict upon another
state an injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration of
its own advantage."
'6 5
It is arguable, therefore, that when a state arbitrarily (without giving
proper disclosure or receiving informed consent from the importing coun-
try) dumps dangerous products on another and causes injury therein, lia-
bility would attach, unless full disclosure was made, since to hold other-
wise would impose too great a burden on international trade. A more
precise test would require a balancing of the interests and responsibilities
of the countries involved (as suggested by Trail Smelter), and would in-
volve a consideration of the principle of foreseeability of harm, which ap-
plies in a negligence cause of action under U.S. law. Under this theory,
although full disclosure would not necessarily be a complete defense to
liability, it would create a presumption in favor of the exporting country.
Increased export regulation could guarantee full disclosure by exporters
and a freer exchange of information between exporter and importer.
C. Assuming a New Export Policy is Needed, What is the Present Ca-
pability of the United States Regulatory System to Monitor and Enforce
Such a Policy?
The regulation of domestic commerce is administered by three agen-
cies: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Consumer Products
Safety Commission (CPSC), and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).6 While these agencies have reasonably clear statutory authority
65. Id. For a recent analysis of the legal steps a state might take in preventing environ-
mental injury to itself, see Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action In Preventing Inter-
national Environmental Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51 (1981).
66. How the FDA, CPSC, and the EPA will manage under the Reagan Administration
is unclear. However, Reagan's antiregulatory campaign statements have proved to be, in the
short time he has held office, more than just rhetoric. Five days before President Carter left
office he issued Executive Order 12264 which sharply restricted the export of products
banned or restricted in the United States. Exec. Order No. 12264, 46 Fed. Reg. 4659 (1981),
reprinted in [1981] 12C U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 11750. On February 17, 1981, Presi-
dent Reagan issued Executive Order 12290 which revoked President Carter's order in its
entirety. Exec. Order No. 12290, 46 Fed. Reg. 12943 (1981), reprinted in [1981] 1 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS B4.
Reagan's approach has been to reduce both government expenditures and government
regulations. In early May 1981 funding for the CPSC floundered before the Senate Com-
merce Committee. On May 12, 1981, against the express wishes of the Reagan Administra-
tion, the Committee finally decided to fund the CPSC for another two years. Nevertheless,
the CPSC's budget was reduced by 30 percent. Wash. Post, May 31, 1981, at D8, col. 1.
An inadequate budget will severely limit the work an agency can undertake. Domestic
considerations will likely be given priority over export concerns. In September 1981 it was
reported that the Reagan administration was drafting a White House Policy statement
which would ease the way for U.S. companies to export hazardous goods that have been
banned or restricted in this country. The types of products that may be affected range from
highly toxic chemicals such as PCB's and chloroflourocarbons to the banned pesticides
DDT, lindane, and eldrin. Consumer products such as Tris-treated sleepwear may also be-
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to regulate products and substances designed for domestic consumption,
there is substantial ambiguity in their authority over exports. The De-
partment of Commerce has the statutory authority to restrict the expor-
tation of any U.S.-made product if it finds that its exportation would cre-
ate a domestic shortage, or affect national security or foreign policy. 
7
However, when U.S. foreign policy is involved, the State Department will
usually make the final decision.
The inadequacies of our present ill-defined export policy were
brought to light in October 1977 when the CPSC decided it did not have
the statutory authority to prevent the export of domestically banned
Tris-treated sleepwear.6 8 Prompted by several U.S. Congressmen, an In-
teragency Working Group on the Exportation of Hazardous Materials
(Group) was formed in May 1978 to review our present export policy. The
Group consisted of representatives of all regulatory agencies as well as the
Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Justice and the
Treasury. In July 1978, the Group presented its findings at hearings con-
ducted by the Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee
of the Committee of Government Operations. The Subcommittee deter-
mined that the lack of export controls was not confined to the CPSC, but
extended to the FDA, the EPA, and the Department of Commerce.
6
0
Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),'7 0 the FDA can reg-
ulate certain products in the domestic market. A product removed from
the domestic market can be exported without prior notice to the FDA if it
meets .four criteria:
1. The product is in line with specifications of the foreign purchaser.
come unrestricted for export under this proposed policy.
According to the White House statement, the change in export policy is needed because
current pre-export notification requirements place U.S. exporting companies at a competi-
tive disadvantage relative to foreign exporters. The draft policy would replace the present
system with a broader and more general information and education campaign. Instead of
notifying governments when a banned or restricted product is to be exported, the Reagan
administration would provide "brief summary information" to either foreign governments or
international organizations. Under this proposed policy, notification to foreign governments
could theoretically occur years before the product is actually exported. Such a system would
seriously impede the ability of foreign governments to make an "informed choice."
Thus, the outlook for the enactment of appropriate export legislation under the Reagan
Administration is not favorable. Consequently, Congress must not be easily dissuaded from
the views expressed in the 1978 Subcommittee Report, note 15, supra. Foreign policy objec-
tives alone offer important reasons for pursuing comprehensive export legislation which is
responsible to the needs of the importing country and the United States. Wash. Post, Sept.
9, 1981, at Al, col. 1-3.
67. The Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
The Export Administration Act of 1979 has superseded the Export Administration Act of
1969, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-13 (1976).
68. 1978 SUBCoMMIrrE REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.
69. Id. In practice the Department of Commerce cannot impose export controls without
a State Department determination that national security or foreign policy considerations
require them.
70. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976).
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2. The product is not in conflict with the laws of the importing
country.
3. The product is labeled as intended for export.
4. The product is not sold or offered for sale in domestic commerce.'
The effect of these requirements has been at most superficial. Pres-
ently the FDA cannot compel exporters to inform the FDA of an intent to
export banned products. As a result, information as to what exactly has
been exported by the United States is extremely scarce. 2 Notwithstand-
ing statutory requirements, the FDA's policy with respect to some drugs
varies with conditions. The FDA can prevent the export of new drugs
which are unlicensed for domestic use, but it cannot prevent the export
of domestically licensed drugs "even if they are adulterated, misbranded,
out-of-date, or otherwise unfit for human consumption in the United
States."' s
The FDCA also does not require the FDA to notify a foreign govern-
ment of an FDA ban on drugs, food additives, or medical devices.74 Ironi-
cally, the FDA has a policy of notifying foreign officials of health hazard
problems after shipment of adulterated products to that country. FDA
Commissioner Donald Kennedy testified at the Subcommittee Hearings
that the current state of the FDA export policy was "so internally incon-
sistent that it is very hard to know what the policy is.")
7 5
In 1978 legislation was proposed to bring the FDA out of the export
maze. Under the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 19787s two new stan-
dards would apply to all drugs:
1. Approved drugs in compliance with domestic requirements could
be freely exported.
2. Unapproved drugs or approved drugs not in compliance with do-
mestic requirements could be exported only after an export permit
had been approved by the Secretary."
An export permit would be granted only if the exporter demonstrates
that the foreign buyer had assented to its importation after being in-
formed of its legal status here and the basis for that status.78 Scientific
71. 1978 SUBCOMmiTTE REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.
72. For a discussion of what is presently known about the extent of exports regulated
by the FDA, see id. at 11.
73. Id. at 18. A product regulated by the FDA is not considered adulterated or mis-
branded under the FDC Act, Section 801(d), if it (1) meets the specifications of the foreign
purchaser, (2) is not in conflict with the laws of the country to which it is intended for
export, and (3) is labeled that it is intended for export, and (4) is not sold or offered for sale
in domestic commerce. A product which meets these criteria can be legally exported. Id.
74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355-59 (1976). See also 1978 SuacoMmirr REPORT, supra note 15, at
18-20.
75. Hearings, supra note 1, at 150.
76. H.R. 11611. Discussed in 1978 SUBCOMMITr REPORT, supra note 15, at 19. See also
Hearings, supra note 1, at 92 (statements of Dr. Donald Kennedy, FDA Commissioner).
77. 1978 SUBCOMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 19.
78. Id.
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and other technical data would also be made available to the importing
government. Finally, "where such export would be contrary to public
health, '" the Secretary of the FDA could unilaterally deny the permit.
Under this proposed legislation the peculiar nature of one country's
needs could be assessed against the risk of the product. A drug that could
pose dangers in one country might provide "overriding benefits in another
country."80 Commissioner Donald Kennedy also testified at the Subcom-
mittee Hearings that this permit procedure would give added protection
against the export of adulterated and misbranded old drugs and would
make needed drug products more available to foreign countries.81
The problem with this proposed legislation is that it would result in
an increase in the export of nonapproved drugs to developing countries
which do not have the technical and scientific sophistication to make
judgments regarding drug safety. Since a complete ban on unapproved
drugs would not take into consideration the peculiar needs of the import-
ing country, the Subcommittee suggested an alternative: "Instead of al-
lowing the export of all drugs if certain conditions are met, [the draft
legislation] could be changed to prohibit all nonapproved drug exports
except those meeting certain reasonably strict criteria."8' One commenta-
tor has stated that this change would in effect shift the presumption from
allowing a permit before meeting the criteria to prohibiting a permit un-
til meeting the criteria.83 In this way only a limited but vitally necessary
amount of nonapproved drugs will enter foreign markets.
The CPSC administers the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(FHSA)," the Flammable Fabrics Act (FFA),85 and the Consumer Prod-
ucts Safety Act (CPSA)." The purpose of these acts is to allow the CPSC
to promulgate safety standards and to ban unreasonably dangerous prod-
ucts from the domestic market. Prior to the Tris-sleepwear incident,
79. Id.
80. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 341.
81. 1978 SUBcoMMIrrE REPORT, supra note 15, at 19.
82. Id. at 20.
83. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 341.
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74 (1976). Section 1273 was amended in 1978 to require U.S.
exporters to file a notification statement with the CPSC. This section is almost identical to
the notice requirement under section 1202(c) of Flammable Fabrics Act (FFA) discussed
infra note 85.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1976). Under a 1978 amendment, products intended for
export are exempt from the provisions of this statute, unless the CPSC determines that
exportation would present an unreasonable risk to persons residing in the United States. 15
U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1976 & Supp. .1980). U.S. exporters of materials or products that fail to
conform to an applicable flammability standard or regulation must file a statement with the
CPSC not less than 30 days before exporting the product to the foreign country. The state-
ment must include date of shipment, destination, type of product, and quantity to be
shipped. Notification to the importing country is not required under this new amendment.
Moreover, the CPSC may, for good cause shown, exempt the U.S. exporter from this re-.
quirement. 15 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1976).
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products that had not been introduced into domestic commerce could be
exported without restriction, regardless of the degree of hazard they
presented. Consequently, the Commission has asked Congress to amend
the present statutory authority so that it could prohibit exports of haz-
ardous products. Under these proposed amendments, U.S. exporters
would be required to notify the CPSC of an intended export of a hazard-
ous product not in conformity with the CPSA, and the Commission would
in turn be required to notify foreign governments of the product's status
(within the United States). As long as the exported product was labeled
in accordance with the laws of the importing country, the product would
be exempt from export restrictions.
The Subcommittee also recommended that CPSC authorization
should contain (1) a certification requirement by the importing country,
(2) a labeling requirement by U.S. exporters, and (3) a grant of Commis-
sion discretion to ban outright the export of hazardous products.8 7 It is
not clear from these proposed changes that the foreign purchaser will be
given adequate notice upon which to make a sound judgment about the
product's acceptability (i.e. risks versus benefits). Because developing
countries either have no labeling standards or inadequate standards,
these amendments do not ensure that labeling or quality control of prod-
ucts intended for export will be carried out properly.
The EPA, which implements the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)" and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act'
(FIFRA),19 can temporarily suspend, ban outright, or limit the use of cer-
tain chemicals and pesticides from the U.S. market. Under section 12 of
TSCA any chemical substance intended for export and so labeled is ex-
empt from TSCA's regulatory provisions. The only other requirements
relating to export are that the U.S. exporter notify the EPA of an intent
to export and that the EPA notify the importing government of the avail-
ability of the data about the chemical.
At present regulatory action under TSCA has been limited to two
chemicals and neither has been completely banned from exportation."
Thus, without specific rules for implementing section 12 of the Act, the
notification requirement remains ineffective.
While TSCA's export provisions have not received the attention they
should have, the investigation of FIFRA-due mainly to the potential
worldwide danger pesticide use now poses-has been different. Originally
enacted in 1947, FIFRA was amended in 1972 to require the EPA to no-
tify foreign governments and international organizations through state
department channels of pesticides which were cancelled or suspended
87. 1978 SuBcoMmiar REPORT, supra note 15, at 17.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976).
89. 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -136y (1976 & Supp. 1980).
90. 1978 SuaCOMMira REPORT, supra note 15, at 14; Schulberg, supra note 14, at 345
n.78.
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from use in the United States. 91 The amendment also exempted from fur-
ther U.S. regulation pesticides which conformed to the specifications of
foreign purchasers and were intended solely for export."2
Like the notification provisions of TSCA, the notification provision
of FIFRA (section 17) has rarely been invoked by the EPA. In the past,
the EPA limited its notification to foreign governments to only those situ-
ations where the EPA had taken final action on a substance, where all
pesticide use had been cancelled, or where the cancellation was initiated
by the EPA.98
The drawbacks of this practice were several. First, the EPA rarely
considered its actions as final and gave no definition of a final action;
second, if a pesticide was cancelled for a particular use or several uses,
notification would still not be required as long as at least a sirfgle domes-
tic use remained; third, U.S. exporters would initiate their own cancella-
tion of a pesticide from domestic use-usually when cancellation by EPA
was imminent-and thereby avoid the notification requirement. Ironi-
cally, many regulatory actions were taken by the EPA, having both na-
tional and international significance." In short, the ability or desire of the
EPA to control adverse impacts of exported pesticides was a nullity.
In an attempt to correct these shortcomings, Congress amended
FIFRA in 1978 by enacting the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978." Among
the major changes were:
1. statutory labeling and misbranding requirements on exported pes-
ticide products;
2. registration of establishments producing pesticides solely for ex-
port (previously exempted from this requirement);
3. a requirement that all pesticides that are not registered, including
those whose approval have previously been denied or revoked by
EPA, be marked accordingly;
91. The State Department acts primarily as a conduit between the federal regulatory
agency and the importing country. The agency notifies the State Department of actions it
has taken with respect to specific substances or products. The State Department then relays
this information to the U.S. embassy in the importing country who in turn relays the infor-
mation to the appropriate ministry or official. Unfortunately, this process has not worked.
Either the federal agency fails to notify the State Department or the U.S. embassy fails to
relay the information to the proper official. Often State Department notices are delayed and
rarely-if ever-are they considered for their content. See Hearings, iupra note 1, at 239-55
(statements of Sharon E. Ahmad and Rauer H. Meyer).
92. 1978 SuBcoMMrrrEs REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
93. Id. at 21.
94. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 352. Schulberg states that after the Kepone incident in
1976, "the Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation con-
cluded that manufacturing plants producing pesticides and related chemicals exclusively for
export did not have to comply with the Insecticide Act's requirement of registration of pes-
ticide manufacturing establishments." Id. Thus, prior to the 1978 amendment, it was legal
to export any pesticide without notifying the EPA. Hearings, supra note 1, at 69-70 (state-
ment of S. Jacob Scherr).
95. 7 U.S.C. § 136(o) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
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4. requirements that the foreign purchaser of an unregistered pesti-
cide sign, prior to export, a statement acknowledging that the pesti-
cide cannot be sold in the United States;
5. a copy of the acknowledgment statement (in No. 4 above) would
be transmitted to the appropriate official of the importing country;
and finally,
6. a requirement that the EPA provide upon request of a foreign
government all information related to the cancellation or suspension
of a pesticide registration."
Certainly these amendments have improved the ability of the EPA to
control pesticide exports. However, they stop short of requiring certifica-
tion by an appropriate foreign official that the information about the sta-
tus of a particular product has been conveyed. Without this certification
element, there is no guarantee that proper notification will be carried out.
In this same vein, none of the amendments require U.S. pesticide
manufacturers who export both cancelled and unregistered pesticides to
inform EPA of the country of destination of the proposed export. Such
information would expedite notification to those countries.
Although these regulatory agencies lack the necessary authority to
properly restrict the export of banned produdts, under the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1969 the Department of Commerce has the authority
and general responsibility of controlling U.S. exports when they signifi-
cantly affect U.S. foreign policy. 97 Despite this statutory authority the
Department of Commerce has been virtually powerless whenever the is-
sue of foreign policy has arisen, deferring instead to the State Depart-
ment. Unfortunately the State Department has advocated a "hands off"
policy with respect to the export of banned products, arguing that foreign
governments are in the best position to establish their own standards of
public health and safety and that our only role is to provide them with
certain information when U.S. regulatory bodies require it.9 This posi-
tion ignores three important considerations. First, most developing coun-
tries do not have the means or know-how to establish health and safety
standards which will adequately protect their citizens. Second, although
the State Department has acted as a conduit for passing information to
foreign governments in limited situations, even this limited procedure has
proved ineffective because the notices sent by the regulatory agencies
through the State Department often are not received by the importing
country. Third, present regulations calling for notification to foreign gov-
ernments only require notification in limited situations. A wide range of
hazardous substances still remain untouched by any controls.
Evidently the only avenue for change with respect to our export sys-
tem must come in the form of congressional legislation and it must focus
on our present regulatory agencies-the EPA, the CPSC, and the FDA.
96. Id.
97. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1976 & Supp. 1980). See also note 67 supra.
98. 1978 SuBcoMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
VOL. 10:537
U.S. EXPORT OF BANNED PRODUCTS
This legislation should address itself to current regulatory provisions
which should:
(1) provide the agencies with adequate authority to develop informa-
tion on the nature, extent, and value of exports of banned products
and the country of destination;
(2) provide for adequate notification to foreign governments;
(3) give regulatory agencies adequate flexibility, and discretion in
dealing with the export of banned products;
(4) provide adequate protection to U.S. citizens from reimportation
of banned products; and
(5) provide adequate labeling of banned products which are
exported.
D. How Would a Restrictive Export Policy Affect Developing
Countries?
Essential to a comprehensive export policy are the requirements of
notification of product hazards by the exporter and certification (or ac-
knowledgement) of notification by the importing government. But some
critics argue that stricter U.S. standards of notification and certification
would be an unacceptable intrusion on the sovereignty of foreign nations,
and might be interpreted as absolving American exporters of liability for
their products.19
From the standpoint of international law, foreign nations have no
sovereign right to purchase goods (in the absence of a contract or treaty)
produced in the United States. As one commentator has stated, "Every
country is ultimately entitled to determine within the limits of interna-
tional morality, what it will provide and to whom. The use of this prerog-
ative is entirely legitimate ...."100
The Subcommittee's position on this point was that an acknowledge-
ment of notification by the foreign government regarding products about
to enter its country is not an approval of exportation, but merely a "re-
turn receipt requested" for information delivered.101 In response to the
State Department's position that "no country. . . should establish itself
as the arbiter of other's health and safety standards," the Subcommittee
believed that the United States was not trying to impose its health and
safety judgments on other nations, but simply trying to assume some of
the responsibility for the products it introduces into the world's mar-
ket.10 2 The notification and certification requirements do not dictate what
99. Id. See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 240. (Statement of Sharon E. Ahmad, Direc-
tor, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of
State).
100. Alston, supra note 22, at 455 n.272.
101. 1978 SutcoMMrrrTz REPORT, supra note 15, at 24.
102. Id. Ironically, a representative of the State Department admitted there might even
be instances where some drugs, produced in the United States, should be banned from ex-
port consideration altogether. Hearings, supra note 1, at 250-51 (Statements of Rep. Benja-
min S. Rosenthal, Chairman, Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee
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is or is not safe for the foreign country's own citizens. On the contrary,
these procedures would be imposed out of deference to the importing
country so that foreign governments can be aware of what products we
have determined to be deleterious or dangerous.
There is a separate justification for these requirements: When perti-
nent information on a product is exchanged between the exporting and
importing country, as it would be under the notification-certification pro-
cedures, guidelines to prevent indiscriminate product-use could be estab-
lished, thereby providing a measure of safety for U.S. citizens who might
otherwise be affected through reimportation.
In addition, the interpretation that these requirements would absolve
the exporter of liability has no foundation in international law. However,
the "consent" nature of the certification requirement makes this con-
cern-liability of the exporter-legitimate. This could be resolved by en-
acting legislation so that the certification requirements would not absolve
the contract liability between buyer and seller.'
Probably the most critical question a new export policy must answer
is whether it could accommodate those underdeveloped countries who are
financially and technologically unable on their own to make a risk-benefit
analysis of a potential import. Should our export policy prevent exporta-
tion when the importing country cannot make its own assessment? The
answer should be "no," for the following reason. When the product is
such that the risk of non-use in the importing country is greater than the
risk of use, the United States should permit its exportation. Scientific as-
sessment of the risks and benefits could be conducted by the appropriate
U.S. regulatory agency in conjunction with officials of the importing coun-
try to ensure that a well-informed choice is made.'"
One of the most publicized cases which illustrates why this approach
could work (without any "backlash" from foreign officials) involved the
drug Depo-Provera. Depo-Provera, a long-term injectable contraceptive,
had been banned for domestic use in the United States. 05 Several Third
World leaders claimed that the drug would help reduce their over popula-
tion problems and their associated illnesses and mortality rates. They ar-
gued that not only was this drug vitally needed in their countries, but
that, unlike the United States, they had no effective alternatives. Hence,
and Sharon E. Ahmad, Director, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economics and
Business Affairs, Department of State).
103. Id. The Subcommittee further stated that the total number of export transactions
which would come under these proposed procedural requirements would be small. The Sub-
committee believed that if losses did occur as a result of such controls, the impact on our
balance of payments would be minimal. Id. at 25.
104. See note 105, infra and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 25. Another important example involved the antibiotic chloromycetin.
Chloromycetin was severely restricted in the United States to a few serious diseases. The
FDA had determined that its risks greatly outweighed its benefits. However, in some less
developed countries the drug is widely used to combat a variety of serious diseases or infec-
tions which are uncommon in the United States. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5.
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the United States was faced with a dilemma: Should it permit the drug to
be exported, risking the harm it might cause to foreign consumers, or
should it deny exportation and risk diplomatic tension with the Third
World. The present regulatory system was without the tools to deal with
the highly volatile nature of this situation. Thus, the affair became prima-
rily a matter of foreign policy with the export regulatory system taking a
back seat.
This case presents a clear illustration of the inadequacies of U.S. ex-
port policy. A more finely tuned and comprehensive policy would make
sound decisions possible on matters similar to the Depo-Provera case,
without the United States being forced into a diplomatic corner.
E. What Reforms in the Export System Should be Instituted?
To ensure the greatest protection to foreign and U.S. consumers alike
without unfairly infringing upon the rights of U.S. exporters and of each
nation to establish its own national health and environmental standards,
the Subcommittee made the following proposals for a uniform export pol-
icy. New legislation should:
(1) provide all regulatory agencies with the necessary statutory au-
thority to (a) determine whether a product banned from the domestic
market should be allowed to be exported; (b) collect data regarding
items banned or not in compliance with agency standards; (c) require
that exports be conspicuously and correctly labeled; and (d) totally
prohibit the export of a product that it has reason to believe would be
dangerous to any consumer;
(2) require the regulatory agencies to notify foreign governments of
all actions taken and all proposed actions which may affect the im-
porting country;
(3) provide a means for giving technical assistance and training to
officials of developing countries to enable them to make sound regula-
tory decisions;
(4) require that foreign governments certify that they have received
notification and fully understand the status of the export product.'06
To guarantee that these proposed changes are carried out, the follow-
ing measures should also be taken. First, there should be a permit system
in which prior to the export of a domestically banned product the ex-
porter must obtain a permit from the appropriate federal agency.107 This
permit application should require the exporter to provide the agency with
necessary product data upon which the agency could make a unilateral
decision as to whether or not the product should be exported. This infor-
mation would also be forwarded to the foreign government for their use in
determining whether to import such a product. The granting of a permit
would be contingent on the agency receiving certification from the appro-
priate foreign office, 'indicating that it received the necessary information
106. 1978 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 24.
107. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 380.
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and approved of the importation. Second, the agency should be required
to notify the foreign government of "every action taken to revoke, amend,
or limit a permit, or registration to sell or use a product on the United
States market."1 8 Third, all exporters should be required to meet domes-
tic quality control and labeling standards. This measure would attempt to
eliminate deceptive practices. '0 9 Fourth, Congress should commit the
United States to comply with internationally accepted standards, as long
as they do not conflict with U.S. standards.1 Finally, the State Depart-
ment should assist the three regulatory agencies in developing a working
relationship with their foreign counterparts.'
Alternatively, U.S. exports of domestically restricted or banned prod-
ucts to countries without the technical know-how to ascertain the health
and safety uses involved (the cost-benefit analysis) could be regulated
separately. Before exports would be permitted, the U.S. manufacturer
would be required to perform a cost-benefit analysis in the importing
country. The financial costs could be borne either by the U.S. company
alone, or by the U.S. company and the importing country. U.S. regulatory
bodies could provide the structure within which these negotiations and
analyses could take place-thereby ensuring the vitality of U.S. foreign
policy objectives with respect to the particular country and region.
IV. CONCLUSION
Advanced industrial nations may be able to recognize and exclude
dangerous substances from importation, but less sophisticated govern-
ments lack the necessary knowledge and administrative capability to pro-
tect their citizens and environments. A tenuous equilibrium exists be-
tween the minimal concern presently shown by the United States and the
possibility of becoming the world's environmental policeman. Finding the
right balance will not be an easy task. An increasing number of develop-
ing countries object to becoming the dumping grounds for the industrial-
ized world. Others object almost as loudly to having the developed
world's standards imposed upon them.
It is not clear whether the solution lies in the development of inter-
national standards. But it will be many years, if ever, before effective
world standards emerge. In the interim the United States must accept
some responsibility for its exports by establishing standards which are
compatible with its own and yet comport with the needs of developing
countries. Legislation on this issue must begin now. Lethal pesticides,
toxic chemicals, and dangerous drugs all have a way of returning to haunt
their makers. Mixed in the volatile brew of international relations, they
can become explosive.
108. Id. at 381.
109. Id. at 382.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 379.
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